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THE DEATH OF THE LAW?
Owen M. Fiss t
The 1970s were an exciting and unusual time for legal education in America. The period was marked by the emergence of two
jurisprudential movements which filled classrooms and law reviews
with a remarkable spirit and energy. Today everyone is talking
about theory. The purpose of my lecture, however, will not be to
celebrate these developments, but rather to criticize them. I want to
look at these two jurisprudential movements in some detail, and try
to explain to you, if I can, why and how these movements endanger
the proudest and noblest ambitions of the law. My claim is that
though the jurisprudential movements of the seventies have electrified the academy, they also distort the purposes of law and threaten
its very existence.
In making this charge, it will come as no surprise to you that
one of the movements I am referring to is critical legal studies. I
have spoken of this movement on other occasions, and it has become the subject of articles in a wide variety of popular journals.'
Critical legal studies is deeply entrenched in two of the most prestigious law schools in the country, Harvard and Stanford, and the
institutional turmoil at Harvard has largely been attributed to it.
(Everyone seems to thrive on gossip about Harvard's misfortune.)
This movement has also provoked an unnerving and widely publicized response by Paul Carrington, the Dean of Duke, who argued
that the members of the critical legal studies movement have no
2
place in the modern law school.
These days everyone seems to be down on critical legal studies,
and because I share the egalitarianism that inspires much of the
movement, I am a little sorry about that. I will not, however, draw
Copyright © 1986. Owen M. Fiss.
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back from my critique, but instead try to broaden it. I will try to
place critical legal studies in a larger cultural and intellectual framework and try to link it with the other jurisprudential movement that
arose contemporaneously with it, law and economics. The success
of that movement is not of the kind that generates articles for popularjournals, but it is important to bear in mind that it arose roughly
at the same time as critical legal studies and today is even more
firmly entrenched within the legal academy. Now there is hardly a
major law school that does not have a full-time economist on its
faculty; Yale has two, and five or six lawyers who have had considerable training in economics and who self-consciously define themselves as practitioners of law and economics. Much to my
embarrassment (I have no taste for Carrington's purge), the critical
legal studies movement is virtually unrepresented on the Yale
faculty. Several of the leading practitioners of law and economicsRichard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, Ralph Winter, and Robert
Bork-have recently been appointed to the federal bench, thereby
achieving a measure of power that lies far, far beyond the reach of
any critical legal studies scholar.
The practitioners of law and economics tend to be better behaved; their mission more nearly accords with the traditions of the
academy than does that of critical legal studies scholars. The politics of the two movements also tend to be different. Law and economics is a movement of the right, while critical legal studies is one
of the left. Despite these differences, however, and others that I will
try to elaborate, what strikes me as even more significant is how
much they share. Both movements can be understood as a reaction
to a jurisprudence, confidently embraced by the bar in the sixties,
that sees adjudication as the process for interpreting and nurturing
a public morality. Both law and economics and critical legal studies
are united in their rejection of the notion of law as public ideal. One
school proclaims "law is efficient," the other that "law is politics."
But neither is willing to take law on its own terms, and to accept
adjudication as an institutional arrangement in which public officials
seek to elaborate and protect the values that we hold in common.
I
Law and economics has a descriptive dimension and as such
might be understood as a continuation of the social scientific tradition in the law that began with Roscoe Pound and the realists. It
seeks a patterned description of the case law. The most prominent
hypothesis generated by such an inquiry asserts that the law is efficient, or more particularly, that in defining or shaping rights, judges
have tended to create rules that maximize the total satisfaction of
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preferences. Richard Posner's career was made by going through
one body of decisions after another-torts, contracts, property,
etc.-in an effort to show how each and every one might be understood in such instrumental terms.3 For Posner, the law was by and
large efficient.
The efficiency hypothesis always seemed weak. The evidence
marshalled has not been wholly convincing; 4 the exceptions seemed
almost as important as what purported to be the generalization, and
although a story might be told as to how a particular rule (e.g., the
fellow servant rule) served efficiency, 5 it also seems possible to tell a
similar story about the opposite rule. Even more important, no explanation was ever given for how the law might work in the wondrous way that Posner hypothesized.6 Why would the law always, or
generally, produce the efficient result? An explanatory mechanism
was needed to render the hypothesis plausible (and thus to compensate for the shoddy empirical work). It was also needed to give the
hypothesis some predictive power and to thus fulfill the highest scientific aspirations of this school. Posner and his colleagues claimed
not only that the law was efficient, but that it will be.
On one occasion, at a workshop at Yale in the late sevenfies,
Posner was pressed on this point. He was asked how a body of decisions might be understood as an instrument for maximizing the total satisfaction of preferences when the judges responsible for those
decisions were not trained in economics, did not justify their decisions in those terms, and did not give much evidence that they even
thought about such matters. In fact, it appeared that the judges
thought about everything else but maximization. Posner responded
by describing the work of a colleague who sought to explain the
behavior of rats in terms of maximizing their satisfaction. What was
critical, Posner insisted, was that the rats behaved "as if" the maximization of their satisfaction was their objective and it was not important for the validity of such an explanation that the rats actually
thought about maximization, economics, or for that matter anything
else.
The analogy seemed to many far-fetched, if not downright insulting, but the general theoretical point Posner made was well
taken. "As if" explanations might have predictive validity and do
3
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). A second edition was published
in 1977 and a third edition in 1986.
4 On close inspection, the "law is efficient" hypothesis does not even hold up in
the one area in which it seems plausible. See M. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF
RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1986).
5 Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
6
Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship:A Comment on Clark andPosner, 90 YALE
LJ. 1284, 1291-92 (1981).
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not require self-awareness or any kind of consciousness. It is possible to say that judges are acting "as if" they were trying to maximize
the satisfaction of preferences, even though it could be assumed that
they never thought in those terms. "As if" explanations do require,
however, the identification of some dynamic (e.g., a structure of incentives) that would explain the behavior in question and render the
empirical hypothesis plausible, or even credible. In the case of the
rats there was the cheese; for judges there was no explanation why
they might behave "as if" they were maximizing the total satisfaction of preferences. No reason was given why we should disbelieve
the justification the judges offered for their behavior.
Subsequently, Posner turned away from an "as if" explanation,
and toward what might be termed a "sensible objectives" one: According to this theory, devising rules for maximizing the satisfaction
of preferences is the only "sensible" (or "rational") thing for judges
to do. Posner postulated two types of rules-those that maximize
and those that redistribute-and then further assumed that courts
cannot effectively redistribute and legislatures can. Under these circumstances, the only "sensible" thing for a court to do is to promulgate rules that maximize the total satisfaction of preferences and are
in that sense efficient. As Posner put it, "Courts can do very little to
affect the distribution of wealth in a society, so it may be sensible for
them to concentrate on what they can do, which is to establish rules
that maximize the size of the economic pie, and let the problem of
slicing it up be handled by the legislature with its much greater taxing and spending powers." 7 This sentence comes from an article
written after Posner became a judge, and as such has some special
biographical value. In an earlier paper, he advanced a similar theory
to explain the behavior of litigants. They are likely to fight for efficient rules in the courts, Posner claimed, because that is the only
sensible thing for them to do: "By doing so they increase the wealth
of the society; they will get a share of that increased wealth; and
8
there is no alternative norm that would yield a larger share."
Each and every step in this argument is contestable-the division of judge-made rules into two (and only two) types, the allocations of competencies among various institutions, the assumption
that we all do what is "sensible," etc. In one of the great understatements of his long and distinguished career, Posner said of his
own effort to provide the requisite explanatory mechanism, "some

7 Posner, Wealth Maximization andJudicialDecision-Making,4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.
131, 132 (1984).
8 Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 505 (1980).
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of the links in the chain are obscure." For our purposes, however,
what must be stressed is that a "sensible objectives" theory would
never suffice for a thoroughgoing positivist, especially an economist.
Scientific theories are not built out of claims about what is the "sensible" or "rational" thing for someone to do, but instead require an
identification or description of those observable features of the environment that systematically lead people to behave the way they do
(regardless of what they say about their beliefs or anything else).
That Posner and his colleagues never provided.
The theory of "sensible objectives" fails to supply the explanatory mechanism needed to give the "law is efficient" hypothesis predictive validity, or even descriptive credibility. In that sense, it takes
us no further than did Posner's talk about rats and "as if" explanations. The theory of "sensible objectives" does, however, advance
our understanding of the law and economics movement in general,
for it makes abundantly clear that the efficiency hypothesis rests
largely on a normative assumption-that is the way a judge should
decide cases. Such a normative assumption cannot, of course, save
an enterprise that purports to be descriptive and predictive-the
pretense of scientism must be abandoned-but this assumption can
stand on its own and, in fact, has given rise to what might be regarded as a second branch of the law and economics movement, a
normative one, which in fact has turned out to be the predominant
one.
The aim of this second, or normative, branch of law and economics is not to describe or explain how decisions were in fact made
or predict how they will be made, but rather to guide them. It depicts the normative concepts employed by judges-for example,
equality or reasonableness-as a hopeless jumble of intuitions and
offers an intellectual structure to order those intuitions and give
them content. That structure is the market. According to this
branch of law and economics, the normative concepts of the law
should be construed and applied in such a way as to make the judicial power an instrument for perfecting the market.
The normative branch of law and economics ultimately rests on
the relativization of all values. All values are reduced to preferences
and all preferences are assumed to have an equal claim for satisfaction. The struggle between the neighbors in the typical nuisance
case (to take an example that is at once central to the economic analysis of the law and most congenial to it) is not a conflict between
peace and recreation, understood as public values that have to be
harmonized and ordered, but rather a conflict between those who
9

Id.
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prefer to use the land for recreation and those who prefer peace and
quiet. There is no way, moreover, of judging one preference as
more worthy than the other, any more than there is a way ofjudging
the preference for one flavor of ice cream better than another. Any
choice between the two would be "arbitrary," or to use the jargon of
this school, merely a matter of "distribution" (which means that the
choice does not depend on any universally acceptable criterion, but
rather amounts to favoring the interests of one group over another).
Having thus reduced all values to preferences, and having established that a choice between preferences would be arbitrary, it
then follows that social institutions can have one purpose and only
one purpose and that is to maximize the total satisfaction of preferences. In the ordinary situation, bargaining and exchange are presumably the best means for achieving that end. Individuals know
best what their preferences are and how much they are worth, and
thus they should be free to bargain with one another to obtain the
means (or conditions) of satisfying them. Cash for ice cream. The
exchange will take place only when the positions of both parties will
be improved. In this way, free exchanges among individuals keep us
moving toward the goal of maximizing the satisfaction of
preferences.
With the ordinary commercial transaction, say between a retailer and a customer, the contribution of market exchanges to the
satisfaction of preferences seems clear and obvious. What the new
law and economics movement did, under the leadership of Ronald
Coase, 10 was to perceive a role for market exchange even in noncommercial contexts, such as nuisance cases. The desires of the
parties could not be fully satisfied because there was a conflict, or to
introduce some more jargon, a "costly interaction" between the
two, but an exchange might maximize the total value realizable;
either the sports club could buy out the adjoining homeowner
(which would leave both parties better off-one with the game, and
the other with money) or the bargain could work the other way if the
monetary value to the homeowner of remaining was greater than
the cost of moving for the sports club.
Under this account, law appears to have two purposes. One is
to provide the conditions necessary for effective bargaining (demarcating property rights, assuring bargains are enforced, preventing
fraud, etc.). The law is an indispensable backdrop for the market. A
second mission for the law arises only when bargaining breaks down
or is not possible, as when there are too many people involved. In
such a case, often described as one in which there are "transaction
10

Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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costs," the law takes a more active role, serving as a supplement
rather than a backdrop for the market. It corrects for market failure.
The purpose of law or adjudication in particular is to remove the
obstacles to exchange and, if that is not possible, to replicate the
market outcome. Thejust result is one that either brings the parties
together for exchange or gives them approximately what they would
have received if they had been able to bargain.
For some theorists, mostly in Chicago, the role of law as an institution that supplements and thus perfects the market in this second way is minor, for they assume that market failure (because of,
say, high transaction costs) is the exception and sporadic. Law and
economics merely becomes the handmaiden of laissez faire, though
perhaps with a special twist. Law is not only unnecessary, but, as
emphasized by Demsetz1 ' and the others who have pursued Coase's
essential insight, it is also redundant: No matter how the case is
decided, as long as bargaining remains possible, an exchange between the parties after judgment will maximize the satisfaction of
preferences and move us closer to the efficient allocation of resources. In contrast to the Chicago school, there are some practitioners of law and economics (originally based in New Haven) who
contemplate a larger role for the state and for adjudication. They
see market failure almost everywhere. They acknowledge the power
of the market paradigm, in which all values are relativized and the
maximum satisfaction of preferences is the end of all social institutions, yet they insist that the need for supplementary institutions is
all pervasive. Through the most ingenious of arguments they are
able to embrace both the market and the activist state.
The New Haven school is, in my judgment, closer to the truth
than the Chicago one, especially if the focus shifts from nuisance
cases to the great public law cases of our day. The "transaction
costs" in the typical desegregation case are staggering, to engage in
something of an understatement. It seems to me, however, that the
problem is deeper and that all practitioners of law and economicswhether they be in New Haven or Chicago-are on the wrong track.
The issue is not quantity but quality: It is not that a larger role for
law must be assumed, but rather that its role should be understood
in qualitatively different terms. The role of the law is neither to perfect nor to replicate the market, but rather to make those judgments
that the adherents of law and economics claim are only "arbitrary,"
i.e., a mere matter of distribution. The duty of the judge is not to
serve the market, but to determine whether it should prevail.
This account of law reflects actual practices, how we think and
11

Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter 1 J. LEGAL

STUD.

13 (1972).
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talk about the law. It also reflects thejudiciary's self-understanding.
Judges do not see themselves as instruments of efficiency, but rather
as engaged in a process of trying to understand and protect the values embodied in the law. But recall, at this juncture the claim of law
and economics is normative, not descriptive: As a statement of what
the purpose of the law should be, the efficiency principle is not defeated by the simple (and well-taken) objection that it contradicts
actual social practices or self-understanding of judges by depicting
the law in crudely instrumental terms (as a means of satisfying preferences). The normative claim of law and economics can be defeated only by challenging its first premise, namely, the one that
relativizes all values, and it will come as no surprise that I am happy
to do that too. I do not believe all values are reducible to preferences and that all have an equal claim to satisfaction. Values are
values.
The proponents of law and economics would have us believe
that the typical nuisance case, or for that matter a case such as Brown
v. Board of Education,1 2 is simply a conflict over preferences, and that
it arises because the preferences of all the parties cannot be fully
satisfied. They assign the judge the task of trying to devise some
scheme for maximizing the satisfaction of these conflicting preferences. It seems to me, however, that the conflict before the court is
of a different character altogether-not a conflict arising from a divergence of preferences or tastes, but a conflict between the various
ethical commitments implicit in that body of shared understandings
known as the law. And from that perspective, the assigned task of
the judiciary should not be to devise schemes for maximizing the
satisfaction of preferences, but rather to give concrete meaning and
expression to the values made authoritative by the law. Judges
should order, interpret, and establish a regime of state power for
protecting these values.13 The right of the judiciary to give meaning
to our public values does not rest on the moral expertise of the persons who happen to hold office, but on the processual norms that
simultaneously constrain and liberate those who exercise the judicial power-judges are insulated from the political process and are
required to engage in a special kind of dialogue over the meaning of
those values. This dialogue is arduous and taxing, at times almost
beyond the powers of anyone, but it is an essential part of the process through which a morality evolves and retains its public
character.
347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
13 For an elaboration, see Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
12
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Like law and economics, the critical legal studies movement
starts by emphasizing the openness of the normative concepts used
by the judiciary. The purpose here, however, is not affirmative, but
negative. Critical legal studies scholars do not try to transcend the
uncertainty-they revel in it. Rather than impose an intellectual
structure on all the conflicting intuitions embraced within these normative concepts, critical legal studies scholars accept this openness
or (to use their favorite term) "indeterminacy" as a given. Consequently, they argue, there can be no standards for constraining
judges or for determining whether a decision is correct as a matter
of law. To revert to the example of law and economics, there is no
basis for saying one use of the land is more reasonable than another;
or to move to the public law cases that are much more central to
critical legal studies, there is no basis for saying that one judicial
interpretation of the equal protection or due process clause is truer
than another. The purpose of this exercise is to deny the distinctive
claim of law as a form of rationality. 14 Law is not what it seemsobjective and capable of yielding "right answers"-but rather simply politics in another guise. Judges speak the way they do because
that is the convention of their profession and is needed to maintain
their power, but their rhetoric is all a sham.
The realists of the twenties and thirties were also intent on
demystifying the law, and insisted that the law's claim to determinacy and objectivity was a sham, but their critique was aimed at freeing law from the past (in particular, from its commitment to laissez
faire). Their critique was a prelude to having the law become an
effective instrument of good "public policy." Today there is a strain
of feminism that also seeks to unmask the law-to show how the
privileged position of men in the legal profession has tended to
skew the law, and how neutral sounding concepts or principles have
often served as a cloak for patriarchy. They, like the realists, are
moved by an affirmative vision-if not liberty, then a true and substantive equality-and they appreciate how the law can be used to
further that vision. But that is not critical legal scholarship. 15 Critical legal studies scholars are distinguished (if at all) from feminists
and from the legal realists of an earlier generation by the purity of
their negativism. When critical legal studies scholars insist that "law
14 Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). For two
general collections of material on critical legal studies, see THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE: CRrriQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982); CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1984).

15 Indeed, Professor Frug refers to feminism as a "source" of critical legal studies.
Frug, supra note 1, at 1, col. 2.
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is politics," they mean something quite different and more nihilistic
than either realists or feminists. Critical legal studies scholars want
to unmask the law, but not to make law into an effective instrument
of good public policy or equality. The aim of their critique is critique. Critical legal studies scholars realize that any normative
structure created to supplant law would be subject to the very same
critique they used to attack the law.
A few have tried to go further. They have tried to construct an
affirmative program and to explain what law could become once it is
unmasked, but in each instance the affirmative program offered is
rather empty and unattractive. Indeed, it turns out to be another
form of negativism. One such program has been put forth by
Duncan Kennedy, 16 generally thought of as the Abbie Hoffman of
the movement. 17 Kennedy's program contemplates a particularized
form of adjudication, where judges look at the totality of circumstances and simply decide, without the guidance of rules or principles (which, of course, would be vulnerable to the critique), but with
a full understanding of their historical positiori and a willingness to
assume full responsibility for their decisions. Another so-called affirmative program has been advanced by Roberto Unger, whose
work strikes me as the true inspiration of the movement.' 8 He urges
us to use the judicial power as an instrument of destabilization-of
tearing down whatever structure happens to exist at the time-not
as a means of moving us closer to nirvana (which, given the distortions of existing social structures, cannot be specified), but as a way
of revealing our capacity to transcend the particular context in
which we happen to find ourselves.
Critique without a vision of what might replace that which is
destroyed strikes me as politically unappealing and politically irresponsible. Some suggest that these fears are unwarranted, claiming
that adjudication has a place in these so-called affirmative programs,
and that for the first time it will become "responsible," "intelligible," and "democratic." But this is simply a play on words. I would,
of course, have to accept the critique and live with the political consequences of this critique, however unpleasant they might be, if I
thought for a moment that the critique was intellectually compelling. But in fact it is not. The freedom of the judge that is posited
by critical legal studies and that serves as its central premise simply
does not exist. The concepts of the law may be open-ended, in the
16 Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 646-49
(1982).
17 Granetz, Duncan the Doughnut, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1986, at 22.
18 Unger, supra note 14.
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sense that one cannot reach judgment by a simple process of deduction, but that is not what the law or objectivity requires or even aspires to. What is required is that judges be constrained in their
judgment, and that they certainly are.
When I read a case like Brown v. Board of Education,19 for example, what I see is not the unconstrained power of the justices to give
vent to their desires and interests, but rather public officials situated
within a profession, bounded at every turn by the norms and conventions that define and constitute that profession. There is more
to judging than simply confronting the bare words of the fourteenth
amendment commanding that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Thejustices start with the amendment's legislative history and a body of
cases that has struggled to make sense out of the commitment of the
amendment to racial equality. Guided by years of training and experience, they read earlier cases, and sense which way the law is
moving. They consider the role of the state, and the place of public
education in particular, in the life of the nation and weigh the evidence developed at trial on the impact of segregative practices.
They also know what constitutes a good reason for distinguishing
Plessy 20 or for deciding the case one way or another. In sum, the
justices are disciplined in the exercise of their power. They are
caught in a network of so-called "disciplining rules" which, like a
grammar, define and constitute the practice ofjudging and are rendered authoritative by the interpretive community of which the justices are part. 2' These disciplining rules provide the standards for
determining whether some decision is right (or wrong) and for justifying it (or for contesting it). They constrain, not determine, judgment. Of course, disagreement can still take place, as it has
throughout history. But disagreement-at least within modest proportions-is not destructive of law. Rather, it is generative of it:
Disagreement is in fact an essential part of any collaborative moral
enterprise within a changing society.
In this account of adjudication I recognize that I am making an
empirical assumption about the richness of the legal system in a
country such as the United States. I am assuming that our legal culture is sufficiently developed and textured so as to yield a body of
disciplining rules that constrains judges and provides the standards
for evaluating their work. This assumption is, of course, open to a
factual challenge, as any empirical claim must be. Indeed, I ad19

347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21 This account draws on my earlier works, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 739 (1982) and Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985).
20
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vanced this theory a few years ago, and nowadays I wonder whether
I am mistaken in making this assumption and whether I am guided
more by a duty to see the best in life rather than by a tough assessment of the facts. The proponents of critical legal studies are not,
however, prepared to disagree with me on these (mundane) terms.
For their claim is not that, as a factual matter, in some particular
legal system, or at some historical phase, judges are not constrained
by law, but rather that law, by its nature, can never provide the constraint needed to achieve objectivity. Their idea is not that there are
no right answers, but rather that there can never be a right answer.
To support so ambitious and extravagant a claim, most resort to
22
Duncan Kennedy's theory of the "fundamental contradiction"
(though some, like Frug 2 3 and Levinson,2 4 believe-quite falselythat the key may be found in Derrida, Fish, Miller, and other literary
theorists of the deconstructive bent).
According to Kennedy's theory of the "fundamental contradiction," all normative concepts are infected with an unresolvable conflict. They deconstruct into two (or more) antithetical and
competing forces, impulses, or desires, such as the desire for others
and the fear of others. So infected with contradictions, a normative
concept (or any rule, principle, or standard generated out of it) cannot act as a restraint upon the judge, for it always affords the judge a
choice. The judge can favor one antipode over the other and nonetheless be said to be (honestly) applying the rule. The "fundamental contradiction" creates a freedom, a choice, and thus renders
everything normative indeterminate, that is, unable either to constrain the judge or provide any standards of evaluation. And it creates this freedom almost as a matter of logical necessity. There is
nothing contingent, limited, or empirical about the "fundamental
contradiction." It is no mere "tension."
There is no proof or even an argument on behalf of the "fundamental contradiction." Its existence is simply asserted by Professor
Kennedy in the midst of an exceedingly long analysis of the table of
contents of Blackstone's Commentaries. I am not even sure whether
the existence or validity of the "fundamental contradiction" can be
proved or demonstrated, given its universal scope. Operating much
like a moral axiom, it ultimately rests on an appeal to common experience. In response, one can always appeal to a different under22 Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 211
(1979). For his subsequent "thoughts" on the idea, see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
23
Frug, supra note 1, at 28, col. 1.
Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982). For the response, see
24
Fish, Interpretationand the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEx. L. REV. 495 (1982). See also Weisberg,
Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. REV. - (1986).
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standing of that very same experience and assert with equal fervor
that the normative structures of the law are not riddled with "fundamental contradictions." I am prepared to do just that. Moreover, I
might point out that the stakes are greater than they at first appear.
What is at issue as one starts down the road of the "fundamental
contradiction" is not simply the law, but morality as well, or for that
matter any practice, discipline, or institution that rests upon or
otherwise incorporates normative structures. There is no way of
confining the "fundamental contradiction" to law. Everything normative must go. There can never be a right answer in morals, just as
certainly as there can never be a right answer in law.
Some have claimed to the contrary, and once Professor
Michelman-not a member of the movement, but so obviously
drawn to it-insisted that while there could never be a right answer
in the law, there could be (indeed must be) right answers in
morals. 2 5 This view fails to account for the full sweep of the "fundamental contradiction." It also seems to be at odds with common
intuitions. Given the institutional apparatus of the law, and the
shared understandings that bond and animate the profession, I
think it far more likely for there to be right answers in the law than
in morals. Of course, morality does not require "the compulsion of
a transcendent rule," to use a phrase of Michelman's, 2 6 but neither
does law. It requires only constrained judgment. An insistence
upon the contrary, and an attempt to depict the law in other terms,
as "transcendent," "mechanical," or "unitary," strikes me as a desperate but transparent attempt to restrict the critique of critical legal
studies to the law and to render credible a jurisprudence that rests
not on any fancy theory about the "fundamental contradiction" or
anything else, but on a special strain of utopianism, one that rightly
aspires to a true and substantive equality, but fails to accord a
proper place for the institutional arrangements needed to bring that
ideal into being.
III
Critical legal studies and law and economics differ in many important respects-their politics, the intricacies of their arguments,
the definition of their scholarly mission, and of course, their antics.
To claim that "law is efficient" is quite different than saying "law is
25
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politics." I believe, however, that these movements have something
in common, and that what they share is as important as their differences. I have tried to show that they both start from a rejection of
law as an embodiment of a public morality and thus have a common
base line. Critical legal studies denies that there is such a morality
(or, for that matter, any kind of morality) when it argues that all our
normative structures embody an unresolveable contradiction. Law
and economics strikes at the notion of law as public morality too,
but not through the "fundamental contradiction." It does this by
relativizing all values and claiming for itself what Bork, in a gesture
that trivializes the jurisprudence of the sixties, terms the "Equal
Gratification Clause." 27 Under law and economics, the idea of a
public morality once again becomes untenable because values are
transformed into preferences and each preference is assumed to
have an equal claim to satisfaction.
From this perspective, it is no surprise that both law and economics and critical legal studies achieved their ascendancy in
America within the same period of history. Nor is it surprising that
this period was the 1970s-a time of difference and disagreement, in
which the emphasis was not on what we shared, our public values
and ideals, but on how we differed and what divided us. Although in
the 1960s we undertook the Second Reconstruction and tried to
build the Great Society, and we were drawn to law as public ideal, in
the next decade we took refuge in the politics of selfishness. All
normative matters became subjective. The prospect of understanding and nourishing a common morality seemed hopeless.
Locating these two jurisprudential movements within a specific
historical context may also help us understand what must be done.
Law has been threatened by the disintegration of public values in
the larger society, and its future can only be assured by the reversal
of those social processes. In order to save the law, we must look
beyond the law. We will never be able to respond fully to the negativism of critical legal studies or the crude instrumentalism of law
and economics until a regenerative process takes hold, until the
broad social processes that fed and nourished those movements are
reversed. The analytic arguments wholly internal to the law can take
us only so far. There must be something more-a belief in public
values and the willingness to act on them.
Where will that belief come from? In speaking of a public morality and the judiciary's responsibility for giving meaning and expression to those values, I am sustained by a historical vision-by
remembering the 1960s, and the role that the law played in the
27
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struggle for racial equality. But for a generation born after Brown,
after Ole Miss, after Birmingham, after Freedom Summer, and
maybe even after Selma, this vision does not work. It is not fought
but only tolerated as a quaint and even touching remembrance of a
time past. True, today a new cause is taking hold, and it seems to
have achieved (at least in New Haven) the momentum that once belonged to the civil rights movement. I am referring to the women's
movement, which seems to be on the verge of mobilizing an entire
generation of law students. It demands a reexamination of existing
social arrangements and has unleashed for this enterprise a remarkable energy. But for feminism to become, like the civil rights movement before it, the instrument of social regeneration the law awaits,
we-both the bearers of the cause and the community criticizedmust cease to view gender issues as a matter of individual or group
interests, and recognize the claim to sexual equality as an expression of the ideals and values we hold in common.
Beyond that, it is difficult to know how a belief in public values
might be regenerated. Such a process of social regeneration depends on events that are beyond our control and that are even hard
to imagine. It seems to me, however, that law itself might have an
important role to play in this process, for law appears as generative
of public values as it is dependent upon them. The Warren Court
and the transformative process that it precipitated in American society not only presupposed a belief in the existence of public values
but was also responsible for it. Brown assumed that the Constitution
embodied a commitment to racial equality, and that this value was
so real and so important as to warrant moving mountains (almost).
It also generated and nurtured a commitment to racial equality that
far transcended the law.
An appreciation of law as a generative force of our public life
does not make the task we confront any easier. In truth, it compounds the complexity and magnitude of our dilemma, for it suggests that we are caught in a circle: Law is, alas, both agent and
object. Yet an understanding of the generative force of law can also
make us acutely aware of the dangers posed by law and economics
and critical legal studies, and thus strengthen our resolve to resist
them. We need public morality to have law, true, but even more, we
need law to have a public morality. Of course, law will exist even if
the two jurisprudential movements of which I have spoken are victorious, in the limited sense that there will be people who wear black
robes and decide cases, but it will be a very different kind of law.
For (Judge) Kennedy, adjudication will be entirely particularistic;
for Judge Posner it will be wholly instrumental. In neither case will
it be capable of sustaining or generating a public morality. It will be
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law without inspiration. This will mean the death of the law, as we
have known it throughout history, and as we have come to admire it.

